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Abstract 
In the Netherlands in recent years, many changes were implemented in legisla-
tion governing employees’ disability for work. With the objective to reduce 
numbers of ill and disabled persons, the implementation of two new govern-
ment acts, Wulbz and Pemba, shifted a great deal of responsibility for ill em-
ployees to employers by launching financial incentives. The underlying study 
mainly focuses on the relationship between changes in legislation and em-
ployers’ behaviour. To this purpose a survey has been carried out among 1,742 
SME employers. 
This study found that the changes in legislation governing disability for work 
only had a limited impact on the behaviour of employers. Only 35 percent of 
the SME employers had factually intensified their focus on reducing employ-
ees’ disability for work over the past years. Hardly one-third of the employers 
with less than 10 employees had become more active in this field in recent 
years, versus nearly 80 percent of the employers employing 50 to 100 staff. 
These 35 percent may be further divided into 21 percent of employers who say 
they had become more active due to changes in social security legislation, and 
14 percent in respect of whom the above does not hold.  
It was found that knowledge of the new legislation spurs employers to inten-
sify the focus on employees’ disability for work. Besides, a significant correla-
tion was found with opinions as to whether or not influence may be exerted 
on disability for work. Employers who reckoned that influence may be exerted 
in this respect, were found to have intensified their focus on employees’ dis-
ability for work. Also, it was concluded that more positive attitudes versus 
changes in legislation had also contributed to a higher focus by employers on 
reducing disability for work due to those changes. 
Behavioural attitudes of employers who intensified their focus on employees 
disability for work and reintegration mainly manifested themselves in the 
adoption of preventive measures, such as adaptation of tasks or workplace, 
promotion of personal protective-gear use and instruction of employees to 
improve tackling in-company health hazards. Remarkably, despite of being 
prohibited by law, employers also increased their focus on health upon staff 
recruitment. The latter entails an undesired effect of the implementation of 
modified legislation. 
The following typologies in the behaviour of employers were distinguished: 
1. The  preventive employers, who have improved coaching, adapted tasks or 
workplace to prevent, promoted the use of protective-gear use and in-
structed employees to improve tackling health hazards. 
2. The  curative employers, who have checked more in the event of employee 
absenteeism/disability for work and who have improved coaching of ill em-
ployees.  
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3. The  defensive employers, who have checked more in the event of employee 
absenteeism/disability for work and who have increased their focus on 
health upon staff recruitment.  
Employers who during recent years did not change their focus on employees’ 
disability for work, generally failed to see the necessity thereof as they stated 
not to have encountered problems as regards disability for work, and/or be-
cause they reckoned that no influence could be exerted in this respect. A small 
share of those employers who had not intensified their focus on reducing em-
ployees’ disability for work rates did not do so because that subject had al-
ready been high on their agenda. EIM Business & Policy Research  7 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
During the last few years in the Netherlands many changes in legislation were 
implemented regarding short-term and long-term employee incapacity to 
work. One of the most important trends in legislation is the rise in financial in-
centives for employers. Relevant examples of recent changes in legislation are 
the abolition of the sickness benefits for employees (Ziektewet) and the 
changes in the contribution scheme of the permanent incapacity to work 




The intended effects of Wulbz and Pemba are indirect. The idea is that effects 
on the level of disability for work
3 may be realised by changing employers’ be-
haviour through financial incentives. The assumption behind these types of 
regulations is that financial incentives will enhance the attitude and behaviour 
of the employer with respect to prevention, conditions and reintegration of 
the working employee. However, these assumptions were never tested prior 
to the implementation of Wulbz and Pemba. In general, not much is known 
about behaviour of employers and the factors that affect it. 
It is evident that different employers will react to the implementation of legis-
lation such as Wulbz and Pemba in a differing manner. Whereas one employer 
will indeed improve e.g. labour conditions and Human Resource Management 
(HRM), a second employer will focus more on health upon staff recruitment, to 
minimise the risk of illness amongst employees in the future. Some may do no-
thing but reinsure themselves. Moreover, there will also be employers that al-
ready pay a lot of attention to labour conditions and HRM and therefore that 
will need no change in their behaviour because of the new legislation. 
The underlying study examines the response of employers to changes in social 
security legislation that aim to change their behaviour through financial 
(dis)incentives. Special attention will be paid to the difference in responses by 
small and medium-sized firms, with no more than 100 employees.  
 
1   Wulbz: Wet Uitbreiding Loondoorbetalingsplicht Bij Ziekte (legislation dealing with the exten-
sion of wages during illness). 
2   Pemba: Premiedifferentiatie en Marktwerking bij Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekeringen 
(contribution differentiation and competition as regards incapacity to work benefits). 
3  In the remainder of this report the impression ‘disability for work’ will be used referring to 
both short-term (absenteeism due to sickness) and long-term incapacity to work.  
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1.2  Problem definition and research questions 
The aim of the underlying study is to gain more insight in the responses by 
employers to financial incentives in government legislation. Some recent 
changes in Dutch social security legislation are used as case studies in this re-
spect. The consequences of the introduction of Wulbz and Pemba on employ-
ers’ behaviour will be studied in particular. 
The general problem definition of the underlying study reads as follows: 
 
What are the effects of financial (dis)incentives in government legislation 
on the behaviour of employers in small and medium-sized firms (SMEs)? 
With respect to this case study of social security, this problem definition leads 
to the following research questions: 
1.  What changes in employers’ behaviour have occurred due to the recent 
changes in social security legislation? In particular, which changes have oc-
curred in the field of reintegration, selection of staff and labour condi-
tions? 
2.  What is the relationship between characteristics of the employer and the 
above-mentioned behaviour? Is there a difference depending on the size of 
firms? Can typologies in the behaviour of employers be found? 
3.  What have been the effects of the behaviour of employers on short-term 
and long-term incapacity to work? 
4.  Are there undesired influences or side effects of the changes in legislation, 
due to employers’ behaviour? 
1.3 Methodology 
In the framework of the underlying study, a telephone poll was conducted 
among a Panel of SME employers.
1 This Panel comprises more than 2,000 SME 
employers (employing up to 100 staff) that will be polled several times a year 
on various topics. During this telephone poll, employers were requested to in-
dicate whether they displayed specific attitudes and behaviour that are char-
acteristic as regards reducing disability for work. Besides, questions were 
posed as to the correlation with relevant legislation. Moreover, in this tele-
phone poll, an attempt was made to gain an initial overview as to employers’ 
motives to effectuate/not to effectuate measures in the framework of reduc-
ing disability for work. Besides, a literature survey was conducted, examining 
the social security regime in the Netherlands, as well as models explaining the 
influence exerted on behaviour. 
 
1   Annex II comprises a questionnaire based on the telephone poll. EIM Business & Policy Research  9 
1.4  Outline of the report 
First, the social security regime in the Netherlands will be described, particu-
larly the recently implemented changes, Wulbz and Pemba. The objectives of 
these changes will be part of this description. Next, in chapter 3, the concep-
tual framework for examining the relation between changes in legislation, 
governmental objectives and SME employers' response will be discussed. In 
chapter 4, the micro data as derived from the 'SME Policy Panel' will be ana-
lyzed. Finally, chapter 5 comprises the summary and the conclusions of the un-
derlying study.  
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2  Changes in social security legislation 
2.1 Introduction 
Answering the research questions demands some background information 
about developments in the Dutch social security system. The underlying chap-
ter contains an outline of these developments. The key topics are the abolition 
of the temporary incapacity to work benefit (Ziektewet) and the changes in 
the financial part of the permanent incapacity to work benefit (WAO).These 
changes led to the introduction of Wulbz in March 1996 and the implementa-
tion of Pemba in January 1998, respectively. 
In this chapter, we shall describe the Ziektewet and WAO prior to the imple-
mentation of Wulbz and Pemba. Next, we shall narrate several recent devel-
opments in the field of social security. Furthermore, we shall provide a de-
lineation of Wulbz and Pemba, including the objectives and the consequences 
of these changes in legislation. Lastly, we shall outline the background of the 
implementation of these laws, i.e. which objectives did the government have 
in mind when implementing these laws? 
2.2  Sickness and disability insurance prior to Wulbz and Pemba 
General information
1 
Historically, the Dutch social security regime distinguishes four main categories 
of social security schemes, i.e. social insurance schemes, complementary social 
services, schemes for civil servants and occupational pension schemes. The so-
cial-insurance schemes are divided into general insurance schemes and em-
ployee insurance schemes. This division is based upon the persons who are eli-
gible for making use of a specific insurance. This study restricts itself to em-
ployee insurance schemes.  
Employee insurance schemes cover the risks of unemployment, incapacity to 
work and medical care. The risks of temporary and permanent incapacity
2 for 
work are thus covered by the employee insurance schemes. 
The Dutch social security system used to have a temporary incapacity to work 
benefit (Ziektewet) and a permanent incapacity to work benefit (WAO).
1 After 
 
1   Most of this section is based on: D. Pieters, Social security law in the fifteen Member States of 
the European Union, 1997. 
2   Until 1998, the permanent incapacity to work benefit also contained a general supplement: 
AAW. In the underlying study, we only concentrate on legislation governing employee absen-
teeism/disability for work and the ensuing response by employers.  
12  EIM Business & Policy Research 
a person has been entitled to the Ziektewet for one year, this benefit was 
terminated and - on certain conditions and after medical examination - the 
WAO benefit followed. An important difference between both insurance  
types is that people are entitled to a Ziektewet benefit when they are not able 
to do their own work, while people are entitled to a WAO benefit if they, as a 
result of illness or a physical defect, have lost earning capacity in comparison 
with healthy people with identical education and experience background. In 
contract to other countries, Dutch legislation does not distinguish between oc-
cupational and other diseases or accidents. In spite of the fact that employers 
are not able to influence all causes of disability, no distinction is made be-
tween social and professional risk. The point of departure is that the emer-
gence of disability is very radical for an employee. So all kinds of risk are le-
gally covered. Besides, the cause of disability is not in all situations very clear, 
and although the cause of disability might have nothing to do with the work-
ing conditions, the employer is the one who may play a key role in the aspect 
of reintegration. Therefore, the incentive of Pemba is not only pointed at the 
preventive aspect but also on the aspect of reintegration. 
The temporary incapacity to work benefit: Ziektewet 
The insured employees, incapable of carrying out their work due to illness 
were entitled to sickness benefit during at most a year. The concept of illness 
includes physical defects, pregnancy and birth. 
Sickness benefits amounted to 70 percent
2 of the gross daily wages of the in-
sured person (subject to an upper wage limit); incapacity due to real or ex-
pected pregnancy gave rise to a benefit at a level of 100 percent. 
The contribution rate was fixed at a percentage of the wages paid by the em-
ployer and depended on the sector of economic activity. In some sectors, the 
employee paid as well, at most 1 percent.  
The permanent incapacity to work benefit: WAO 
The WAO insures employees who are longer than a year completely or par-
tially disabled, for a wage-replacing benefit. After one year, a medical exami-
nation is enforced, during which it is determined whether someone is com-
pletely or partially incapable of working. A person is considered incapable of 
working if s/he, as a result of illness or due to a physical defect, is not able to 
earn an income from work that a 'standard person' would (theoretically) be 
 
1   The Ziektewet has now been abolished and replaced by an obligation to employers to con-
tinue wage payment in case of illness.  
2   By virtue of the Supplements Acts sickness benefits, unemployment benefits and invalidity 
benefits are where necessary supplemented up to the relevant social minimum. This benefit is 
subject to a means test in which the income of one’s partner and the assets are taken into ac-
count. EIM Business & Policy Research  13 
able to earn, in the place where s/he is, or has been employed, or in the envi-
ronment of that place. The standard person is someone in the same physical 
state as the person concerned, before her/his illness or physical defect occurred 
and with comparable education and experience. Only the theoretical earning 
capacity of the person is relevant; whether a person can actually obtain suit-
able employment is not taken into consideration. 
The disabled are entitled to invalidity benefit on the grounds of an employee 
insurance scheme. The benefit consists successively of: 
•  A benefit for the loss of wages, based on the daily wage and which 
duration depends on the age of the disabled employee and varies from 
zero to six years. 
•  A benefit in continuation of the former, based on the continued daily 
wage. This continued daily wage is compounded from the minimum wage 
with a supplement.
1 
With an incapacity degree of 80 percent or more, this rate equals 70 percent. 
If the degree of incapacity is less than 15 percent, disability benefit is not pay-
able; with a degree of incapacity between 15 and 25 percent, benefit is pay-
able at a level of 14 percent of the last earned wages (subject to an upper li-
mit).
2 
Until 1998, a uniform contribution rate was fixed for all branches of industry.
3 
The employees paid this contribution. The employer deducts the money from 
their wages. 
2.3  Recent developments in the social security regime 
Compared to neighbouring countries, relatively large numbers of people in 
the Netherlands receive income support under the various sickness and disabil-
ity insurance schemes. About 1987, the enormous cost involved spurred de-
bates as to the volume and duration of those benefits. As a consequence, con-
siderable numbers of measures were implemented to reduce the large number 
of people who received benefits instead of wages. Following some minor ad-
aptations to the system, numbers of inactive people were still rising in propor-
tion to the number of active people. Thereafter, the enforcement of social se-
curity laws was looked at critically, while particularly scrutinising whether the 
social security system was too attractive and, therefore, being abused by em-
ployers, employees and persons entitled to benefits. 
 
1   The supplement contains 2% of the difference between the daily wage and the minimum 
wage, multiplied by the number of years the employee is older than 15. 
2   This benefit will also be supplemented if the necessary conditions are fulfilled. 
3   In 1997, the contribution was fixed at 8.45%. Earnings exceeding NLG 294 a day were not ta-
ken into account.  
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As a result, in the 1992-1995 period, three new laws were introduced. Two of 
these laws included measures that are forerunners of Pemba and Wulbz: 
1.  The law reducing the disability benefit
1 of 1992 includes a system of contri-
bution differentiation, which is being enforced since 1 January 1993. The 
social security enforcement agencies (Uvi’s) decide for a united group of 
employers (per sector) a mark for disability for work, and on account of this 
mark, contribution rates were fixed. When the employer realised within 
certain margins a higher or lower mark, her/his contribution rate would be 
higher or lower, respectively. 
2.  The law reducing the number of people who apply for disability benefits
2 in 
1993. In this law WAO benefit recipients were confronted with more tight 
conditions, regarding the level and duration of their benefit, as well as pe-
riodical medical re-examinations.  
3.  In the law on reducing temporary incapacity to work benefit
3 of 1994 the 
implementation of an own risk for employers is one of the main points. Ef-
fective 1 January 1994, the above scheme was complemented by provisions 
under Civil Law, on the grounds of which the employer was obliged to con-
tinue wage payments during relatively short periods in case of illness of an 
employee. The payments had to cover a period of two weeks for small 
companies (employing less than 15 staff), and a period of six weeks for lar-
ger employers (employing more than 15 staff). Payments had to be equal to 
the level of the minimum wage. Based on collective agreements, for the 
majority of employees, sickness benefits were supplemented up to 100 per-
cent of the wages previously enjoyed. At the same time, since 1994, em-
ployers are statutory obliged to draft an in-company reintegration scheme 
at the moment the illness takes longer than 13 weeks. Employers also have 
to develop a temporary incapacity to work policy, in co-operation with the 
Arbo-services
4. In this policy scheme, risks have to be analyzed and preven-
tive measures are adopted. 
 
 
1  Wet Terugdringing Arbeidsongeschiktheidsvolume (TAV). 
2   Wet Terugdringing Beroep op de Arbeidsongeschiktheidsregelingen (TBA). 
3   Change in the Labour Conditions Act (Arbowet) (Wet Terugdringing Ziekteverzuim/Wijziging 
van de Arbeidsomstandighedenwet. 
4   Arbo-services: Occupational health and safety services. Since 1998, all employers have to be af-
filiated to certified Arbo-services. Arbo-services have a wide range of in-house experts in the 
field of working conditions, such as medical officers and safety experts. Arbo-services are able 
to advise and render support to employers on improving in-company working conditions, and 
they will assist in checking on and coaching of ill employees. EIM Business & Policy Research  15 
2.4 Wulbz 
Objective 
The most important objective of Wulbz is to attain a more adequate allocation 
of social cost. The expectation is that long-term disability will decrease further 
if individual employers and employees will be directly confronted with the cost 
of temporary incapacity to work. This means a reduction in the costs of social 
security and also a boosting participation in the labour market. In addition, an 
improvement of labour conditions is expected. 
Description 
With the implementation of Wulbz in March 1996, the obligation of employ-
ers to continue paying wages to ill employees was prolonged.
1 Employers are 
now obliged to continue paying a minimum of 70 percent of the last wages of 
ill employees during 52 weeks instead of two or six weeks.
2 They are free to 
pay ill employees 100 percent of their last wages.
3 During this period of con-
tinuing wage payments to ill employees, the claim to sickness benefits will be 
lapsed fully. The commitment for continuing paying wages by employers is 
laid down in the Civil Code.  
Since the implementation of Wulbz, it is clear that employers and employees 
have different relationships with the enforcement agencies (Uvi’s) in the field 
of short-term incapacity to work.
4 Employers assume the role of insurer now. 
However, employers still have some obligations towards the Uvi enforcement 
agency during the first year of employee’s disability for work. Wulbz awards 
the social insurance agencies (Uvi’s) monitoring and control tasks during the 
first year of employee disability for work. Several provisions should focus on 
early detection by and interference of the Uvi enforcement agency. After 13 
weeks of consecutive illness of employees, employers are obliged to report this 
to the Uvi enforcement agency. At the same time, employers have to draft a 
preliminary in-company reintegration scheme comprising plans to reintegrate 
ill employees into the labour process, which scheme will also be sent to the Uvi 
enforcement agency. Finally, in the 39
th week of illness, a full in-company rein-
tegration scheme must be presented to the Uvi enforcement agency. When 
employers do not meet these obligations, they may expect a penalty. 
 
1   Wet Terugdringing Ziekteverzuim; see also section 2.4. 
2   The old system, the Ziektewet, is still reserved for a special group of temporary workers, preg-
nant women and unemployed people who fall ill. These groups would otherwise be insuffi-
ciently protected against the risk of temporary disability because they do not have a formal 
employer. 
3   This obligation is based on Article 7:629 BW (Civil Code). 
4   Tweede Kamer, nr. 22187, 1998-1999, Ziekteverzuim en arbeidsongeschiktheid. 
 CTSV,  Augustusrapportage Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekeringen, 1997.  
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The enforcement agencies (Uvi’s) also check whether employers meet legal ob-
ligations, such as, for instance, coaching of ill employees and offering them an 
alternative possibility for in-company reintegration. An enforcement agency 
(Uvi) may also be consulted for furnishing a second opinion in the event of dis-
cords between employers and employees. 
Consequences 
The implementation of Wulbz has some consequences for employers and for 
employees. In the underlying section, the main consequences will be outlined. 
Employers 
The implementation of Wulbz entails a huge responsibility for employers. 
Since the implementation of Wulbz, employers are entirely responsible for the 
obligation to continue paying wages to ill employees during 52 weeks; they 
are also free to decide how to deal with this responsibility. This has financial as 
well as non-financial aspects, which are linked together. Owing to the higher 
financial responsibility, employers are expected by the legislator to look ac-
tively for solutions in the event of employee’s temporary incapacity to work 
caused by problems related to the working environment. 
Employers are free to deal with the (financial) responsibility in different ways. 
Despite the fact that risks for larger employers are more predictable than for 
small employers, and that financial risks for small and medium-sized employers 
(SME) are higher, no exceptions in legislation are made for different firm sizes. 
The justification for this is that SME employers have the possibility to reinsure 
themselves against risks that they cannot meet from their own resources.
1 
Besides, employers are free in the way they make use of the Arbo-services’ su-
pervision and coaching in the event of employee’s temporary incapacity to 
work.  
Employees 
The implementation of Wulbz has no financial consequences for ill employees: 
they can be assured of continued wage payments. On the other hand, it is pos-
sible that employees will have a direct interest in reducing the temporary in-
capacity to work. Since Wulbz, ill employees have to deal with their own em-
ployers or their Arbo-services instead of a big organisation like a Uvi enforce-
ment agency. This may have positive as well as negative aspects in relation to 
the temporary incapacity to work rate. More activities will be aimed at the in-
 
1   With the implementation of Wulbz, a number of insurance possibilities were developed that 
made it possible for small employers to insure themselves at a relatively favourable contribu-
tion. For example, covering contracts for short-term as well as long-term disability between 
one or more insurance companies and overall employers’ organisations. Of course, it is uncer-
tain whether these relatively favourable contracts can be maintained. EIM Business & Policy Research  17 
dividual, related to prevention, coaching and reintegration. This may have the 
consequence that employees report themselves ill less easily. On the other 
hand, the risk is looming that employees feel an enormous pressure to reduce 
temporary incapacity to work as much as possible, so they work on while be-
ing ill. If they finally report ill, it often will take longer before they recover 
and can work again. Therefore, this may also have a negative effect on the 
temporary incapacity to for work volume. 
2.5 Pemba 
Objective 
The objective of Pemba
1 is to stimulate employers to pursue an effective pre-
ventive policy (by achieving adequate working conditions) and an adequate 
in-company reintegration policy (by recruiting, and by maintaining ill and dis-
abled persons in their jobs). On the one hand, this has been done by giving 
employers more financial responsibility, and on the other hand by extending 
the number of measures to stimulate employers to recruit disabled employees. 
The expectation was that during the first years after the implementation of 
Pemba, the volume of WAO influx would be reduced by 10 to 15 percent, as a 
consequence of these measures. It was expected that the total volume in the 
WAO in 2000 should be around 30,000 years of benefit lower than without 
the measures in Pemba.
2 
Description 
Pemba was implemented in January 1998. It changed the way disablement 
benefits are financed, i.e. the method of calculating and collecting contribu-
tions. Pemba has no consequences for the amount or duration of the WAO 
benefit. The financial responsibility of employers foreseen by the legislator en-
tails that the contribution for the disability benefit is now fully paid by em-
ployers. The contribution consists of two parts: a basic part and a differenti-
ated part. The yields from the contributions of the basic part are used for pay-
ing two kinds of benefits: the benefits that started before January 1998 and 
the benefits that arise under the new regime from the moment the benefit 
lasts longer than five years. There will be an effect on the basic part only from 
2003 onwards. Yields from contributions of the differentiated part are used 
for paying benefits that started after January 1998, and last less than five  
years. 
 
1   In Dutch, Pemba stands for: contribution differentiation and competition in connection with 
disablement benefits. 
2   CTSV, Augustusrapportage Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekeringen, 1998.  
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The rate of the basic part is the same for every employer, and the rate of the 
differentiated part depends on the number of employees in the company who 
are entitled to a disability benefit. The main principle is that the higher the  
rate of influx of disabled employees, the more contribution an employer has 
to pay for disability. When the rate of influx is higher than the national aver-
age, the employer's contribution is higher. Consequently, at a lower rate, em-
ployers receive a deduction in their disability contributions. In other words: 
employers have a greater (financial) responsibility for the WAO cost that arise 
if their employees claim benefits under the WAO. The Uvi enforcement agency 
remains responsible for the judgement about the rate of disability. 
In addition, employers who recruit a disabled person will be rewarded by way 
of remission and reduction of WAO contributions. If this rate is more than 5 
percent of the total wage bill of staff with a disability, they do not have to pay 
the basic WAO contribution for those employees. They are also granted a re-
duction on the basic contributions for other employees. This reduction applies 
up to a maximum of 15 times the average wage bill per employee. This meas-
ure makes it attractive for employers to recruit disabled persons.
1 
To avoid high fluctuations in contributions, the law stipulates a minimum and 
a maximum rate. The level of the differentiated contribution depends on em-
ployer size. This has been done specifically for SME because in those employ-
ers, one case of disability can change the rate of WAO influx dramatically. 
Large employers (at most 15 times the national average total wage bill per 
employee) are affected by a maximum rate only, and small employers (less 
than 15 times the national average total wage bill per employee) are affected 
by a maximum as well as a minimum rate.  
Furthermore, for the judgement for the classification small/large employer and 
the estimation of the total amount paid for WAO benefits to employees for 
the year 1999, the year 1997 will be used as level year. This also implies that 
there is a gap between the behaviour and the financial stimulus. 
However, employers may choose not to pay the differentiated contribution 
and pay the cost of disabled employees themselves for the first 5 years.
2 In 
other words, they may opt out for the differentiated part of the contribution 
and chose to bear their own risk or to buy private insurance. After five years 
of disability, a disabled employee will automatically fall back into the public 
system. Employers choosing to bear the financial risks of one of their employ-
ees becoming disabled may wish to cover this risk by taking out insurance with 
a private insurance company. In the beginning of 2000, only 2,648 employers 
had chosen to bear their own risk. Among these are some large financial insti-
 
1   Elsevier, Sociale Verzekeringen Almanak, 1998; Netherlands Ministry of Social Affairs, A new 
disablement benefits system, The Hague, 1997. 
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tutions (banks and insurance companies) and many employers in the graphical 
industry. 
If employers opt for bearing the financial risks themselves, it is very important 
for their employees that the compulsory WAO contributions can be met, even 
if the employer runs into less fortunate times. If an employer applies for ac-
ceptance as an employer who bears the risk her-/himself, s/he must be able to 
provide security in the form of a declaration drawn up by a reliable credit in-




Pemba is of particular importance for employers; it will have very few effects 
on employees. In this section, the main consequences will be outlined. 
Just as with Wulbz, Pemba has financial as well as non-financial consequences 
for employers, which are linked together. Employers may choose the way they 
insure themselves against the risks of permanent incapacity to work. If they 
decide not to make use of the public system anymore, they will have to as-
sume the cost for disability themselves. The idea of course is that through 
financial responsibility employers have a main interest in reducing the number 
of disabled employees as much as possible. The rate of disabled employees 
may (possibly) be influenced by prevention, coaching, HRM and adequate 
working conditions. Employers bearing the financial risks themselves are also 
responsible for in-company reintegration. If they feel there are no (more) pos-
sibilities for adapted work in their employer, they may request the social in-
surance agency to take over their reintegration activities. The agency will 
check whether employers who have undertaken to bear the risks themselves 
have effected adequate action to enable a return to work in their employer. In 
addition, the afore-mentioned Arbo-services can play a role in the employee 
reintegration process. 
The choice for not making use of the public system is not without risks. Em-
ployers are - at that moment - fully responsible for the reintegration of their 
disabled employees. At the same time, employers have to examine beforehand 
whether their business provides for sufficient possibilities to limit the loss of 
disability cost as much as possible. Besides, the height of the contributions on 
the long term is another uncertain factor, compared to contribution rates in 
the public system. 
It is clear that Pemba entails certain social risks. Increasingly, recruiting healthy 
employees will serve employers' interests. The new method of WAO funding 
could give rise to stricter, health-related staff recruitment procedures. To pre-
 
1   Netherlands Ministry of Social Affairs, A new disablement benefits system, The Hague, 1997.  
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vent this from happening, the Medical Examinations Act has come into force 
as per 1 January 1998. This act does do justice to the proven low value of me-
dical examinations carried out in connection with hirings.
1 
2.6  The government's objectives of Wulbz and Pemba 
The law texts on Wulbz and Pemba
2 show identical objectives. The changes in 
legislation ultimately aim at reducing the number of people who are depend-
ent on social security, i.e. to reduce the level of employees disabled for work. 
The rationale underpinning these objectives is of an economic as well as social 
nature. The economic part entails reducing social security cost; the social part 
entails boosting participation in the labour market and, hence, society. 
The means to reach this is to lay down as much responsibility as possible on in-
dividual actors who may influence the level of employees disabled for work. In 
the old system, prior to Wulbz and Pemba, model behaviour of the employer 
in, for instance, the labour conditions arena did not pay off that much, be-
cause financial profits had to be shared with the collective. The hypothesis un-
derpinning both Wulbz and Pemba is that employers who display 'good be-
haviour' are rewarded by incurring lower cost. In this way, a direct relationship 
is established between the quality of an employer's prevention-cum-reintegra-
tion policy and the number of disabled employees. 
 
 
1   Netherlands Ministry of Social Affairs, A new disablement benefits system, The Hague, 1997. 
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3 Conceptual  framework 
3.1 General  analytical  framework 
As explained before, the objective of the recent legislation governing social 
security is to change employers’ behaviour with the help of (financial) incen-
tives. Even if the financial incentives bring about the desired behaviour of em-
ployers, a question that remains is whether employers actually are able to in-
fluence the rate of employees disabled for work. The conceptual framework 
(see chart 1) shows that there is no direct link between the changes in legisla-
tion and the desired effects. 
The conceptual framework starts with the changes in legislation in the field of 
incapacity to work. These changes have consequences for employers' behav-
iour in relation to (the prevention of) incapacity to work. Finally, this behav-
iour will have effects on the rate of short-term and long-term employee ab-
senteeism/disability for work. 
These three aspects are the main variables of the underlying study. The effects 
of changes in legislation may lead to new objectives and new legislation. 
However, there are exogenous factors that may also have an effect on the re-
lationship between the three aspects. Some of these factors are the business 
cycle, the situation in the labour market and the system of social security. It is 
not always clear whether these factors have their influence on employers' be-
haviour or directly on the effects.  
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One of the basic ideas behind the introduction of Wulbz and Pemba is that an 
adequate prevention-cum-reintegration policy and adequate labour condi-
tions will reduce the number of disabled employees and, hence, the cost in-
curred by employers. Therefore, it should be studied firstly whether the em-
ployers’ response will, indeed, be directed towards prevention of disability for 
work, in-company reintegration and the improvement of labour conditions. 
Apart from the desired, there might also be undesired changes in behaviour. 
For example, one response to the new legislation may be that the employer 
will pursue a stricter selection policy based on the health and expected disabil-
ity for work. During the period of probation or in a fixed-term contract, em-
ployers may pay additional attention to the health of their employees, and in 
the case of high rates of disability for work abstain from offering an open-
ended contract. These actions may reduce the likelihood of an employer hav-
ing to deal with high volumes of employee absenteeism/disability for work. 
Obviously, this strict selection policy was not the intention of the legislator 
when implementing Wulbz and Pemba. This policy may reduce opportunities 
in the labour market of persons with a supposed high rate of employee absen-
teeism/disability for work. This does not correspond to the objectives of the 
implementation of Wulbz and Pemba to stimulate participation in the labour 
market. 
A second response may be that an employer will do nothing extra and just re-
insure the financial cost. This could particularly be the case in SME where one 
disabled person may cause extensive financial loss for the employer. This type 
of employers may even lose interest in improving labour conditions, and in 
prevention-cum-reintegration policy. In that case, the changes in legislation do 
not activate employers but even have an adverse effect. 
The conceptual framework shows that there are serious barriers that may in-
fluence the relationship between changes in legislation and effects. Firstly, it is 
possible that employers will not show the intended behaviour, maybe because 
relationships are not very clear, maybe because of disturbing exogenous fac-
tors. For example, social security bodies might furnish insufficient information, 
or may not offer suitable tools enabling employers to adapt behaviour. Sec-
ondly, employers may change their behaviour, but these changes will not have 
any effect on employees’ disability for work, maybe because the relationship 
between measures and effect is weak or maybe due to exogenous factors. For 
example, it is known that there is a positive relationship between the business 
cycle and the volume of employees’ disability for work. 
Behavioural attitudes will not be enforced: It will not be mandatory for em-
ployers to either or not display specific behaviour. The government strives to 
stimulate employers to display desired behaviour - on a voluntary basis - by 
confronting them with the potential negative consequences (viz. the cost (to 
be) incurred) when not displaying desired behaviour. Therefore, this strive en-
tails indirectly exerting influence on employers’ behaviour. When examining  
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the effects of the legislation, it is thus important to examine the intervening 
process while focusing on employers’ behaviour. Behaviour is the result of an 
uncomplicated process where many factors influence both each other as well 
as behavioural attitudes. The ability to forecast, understand, explain and in-
fluence behaviour demands knowledge about this process. 
Scope and rationale of the underlying study do not permit an analysis of every 
theoretical relationship within the conceptual framework. In this study, we 
shall focus on employers’ behaviour, and on the way this is affected by re-
cently implemented changes in legislation. In the next section, we shall exam-
ine a model for the explanation and prediction of behaviour. Next, we shall 
apply this theory on employers’ behaviour as a consequence of changes in so-
cial security legislation. 
3.2  A model for analysing behaviour 
3.2.1 Behavioural-attitudes  model 
When examining employers’ behaviour, use may be made of general theories 
and models of behaviour. Generally, it may be said that people are more likely 
to be inclined to display specific behaviour if and when this behavioural atti-
tude generates more advantages than disadvantages. This weighing-the-pros-
and-cons process is the core of Fishbein and Ajzen’s
1 theory of rationalised be-
haviour. Their theory provides an explanation of differences in human behav-
iour and, besides, presents a model-like specification of assessments required 
to forecast and explain behaviour. 
According to Fishbein and Ajzen’s theory, behaviour may best be forecasted by 
examining the intention of people to display this behaviour. The intention to 
display specific behaviour does not automatically entail corresponding behav-
ioural attitudes. Thresholds may arise, or impossibilities inherent to a person 
or an environment, whereby the intention cannot be transformed into factual 
behaviour. 
The next question arising is which factors determine whether or not someone 
has the intention to display specific behaviour. According to Fishbein and  
Ajzen, the intention to display specific behaviour may be forecast on the basis 
of two factors, i.e. the attitude of a person and the social norm. The first fac-
tor, attitude, refers to the advantages and disadvantages a person attaches to 
behaviour. Social norm refers to the views of important other parties as per-
ceived by that person. The theory’s point of departure is that people not only 
weigh the personal pros and cons or advantages and disadvantages but, be-
sides, also deliberate on the views held by, for instance, family, friends, ac-
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quaintances, colleagues, organisations, etc. This pertains to the perception by 
acquaintances, colleagues, organisations, etc. This pertains to the perception a 
person has as regards the views held by these other actors. This (perception of) 
social environment may either hamper or stimulate a person’s behaviour. With 
increasing degree of rating the prevailing social norm as positive versus one’s 
own behaviour, a person will be more inclined to display that behaviour. 
The social norm, too, comprises two facets; viz.: 
•  Reference opinion. This pertains to the opinion held by a person as to what 
others may think. 
•  Motivation to conform. This entails the inclination of a person to care 
about one specific other person. One is more likely to care about specific 
persons than about other persons. 
Summarising, according to the theory of rationalised behaviour, behavioural 
attitudes may best be forecast on the basis of a person’s intention. This inten-
tion may be forecast on the basis of attitude and social norm. As explained 
above, attitude and social norm are the aggregate of several components. At-
titude and social norm are not necessarily of equal significance for every type 
of behaviour. This implies that in the model, weights may be attributed to at-
titude and social norm, i.e. weights that represent the relative significance of 
both intention-forecasting entities. 
There may be myriads of other influencing qualities. The model presented by 
Fishbein and Ajzen, however, departs from the assumption that such external 
variables as a person’s socio-economic status, a person’s intelligence properties 
and general attitudes (such as, for instance, a healthy lifestyle, the desire to 
socialise, etc.) exert influence on behaviour. If and when these factors are of 
significance, they will - according to their theory - affect the contemplation, 
valuation, reference opinion and motivation to conform, as well as the relative 
significance a person attaches to social norm and attitude. 
Later on, one major factor was added to the original model presented by Fish-
bein and Ajzen; an addition entailing the personal effectiveness in respect of 
behaviour, pertaining to the opinion a person harbours as to whether s/he 
reckons to be able to display that very behaviour. 
The adapted model of Fishbein and Ajzen serves as the theoretical framework 
of the underlying study. Chart 2 recapitulates how behaviour materialises ac-
cording to these perceptions.  
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Chart 2  Behaviour 
 
Source: Fishbein and Ajzen; derived from De Vries (1988). 
3.2.2    Application of the model on employers’ behaviour 
As concerns non-mandatory behaviour desired by the government, the atti-
tude of the employer is of substantial significance as to whether this desired 
behaviour will factually transpire or not. A positive attitude vis-à-vis the de-
sired behaviour are conducive for the factual materialisation of desired behav-
iour. Whether or not an employer adopts a positive or negative attitude, de-
pends on her/him weighing the pros and cons of the advantages and disad-
vantages. Particularly the following two questions will be of significance to 
employers: 
•  What will be my benefit? This consists of the result expected by employers, 
multiplied by the likelihood that this result may be achieved. 
•  What cost will I incur? Employers will also reflect on the cost to be incurred 
in the event of unfolding specific activities, while discriminating between 
short-term cost and long-term cost incurred. Besides calculating the cost of 
desired behaviour displayed, this also includes calculating the cost (i.e., for 
instance, fines) of not conforming to desired behaviour, or of adopting an-
other - undesired - behavioural pattern. 
Besides contemplations, when weighing the pros and cons, the valuation at-
tached to them by a person is of significance. The result of contemplations has 
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Besides, behavioural intention is determined by the following factors: 
•  Belief or confidence of the employer as regards his/her own effectiveness. 
•  Perceived social norm, as generated by the multiplication of reference opin-
ions (i.e. notions held by important other actors
1) and employers’ motiva-
tion to conform to those opinions. As concerns SME employers, for in-
stance, it seems very likely that the conception of or advice furnished by 
their accountant will have major impact, as for many SME employers, the 
relationship with accountants who assume the role of advisor as regards 
their overall business policy is based on the trust the employers place in 
their advisor.
2 
Whether behavioural intention factually generates behavioural attitudes, de-
pends on possibilities or impossibilities of an employer or the environment: 
•  Sensitivity, knowledge and skills of the employer. These aspects determine 
whether or not an employer is able to tackle various issues. 
•  Preconditions, means, etc. in the environment that enable behaviour. These 
might entail the availability of sufficient financial means, and/or the acces-
sibility to auxiliary devices required. 
3.3  Employers’ indicators in the present study 
The effect aspired by the implementation of Wulbz and Pemba is based on the 
principle of influencing behaviour. The government strives that legislation 
may inspire employers to: 
•  Prevent employees’ disability for work. 
•  Enable (more rapid) in-company reintegration of ill or disabled employees 
by either task adaptation or granting another position. 
Primarily, the prevention of disability for work entails tackling work- and 
workplace-related safety issues, as well as welfare and health hazards. In the 
event of temporary incapacity to work, it is of significance that adequate dis-
ability coaching is effected to avoid that that employee may contract long-
term illness and, conceivably, even be permanent incapable to work. In the 
event of long-term illness looming, the employer should consider and discuss 
the possibilities for in-company reintegration based on the original or adapted 
tasks/position. 
During the telephone poll (see section 1.3), behaviour in the framework of re-
ducing (risks of) employees’ disability for work was operationalized as follows: 
•  (More) Checks on staff absenteeism. 
•  Facilitation of absenteeism coaching. 
•  Adaptation of task or workplace. 
•  Promotion of personal protective-gear use. 
 
1   I.e. other people deemed important by the employer. 
2   See a/o: Brouwers and Zwinkels (1999).  
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•  Instruction of employees to improve tackling in-company health hazards. 
•  Stimulation of reintegration of ill employees. 
•  Health-related risk selection (i.e. improved focus on health upon staff 
recruitment). 
•  Insurance cover as regards the risks of employee absenteeism/disability for 
work. 
Both, desired behaviour (preventive measures and stimulation of reintegra-
tion) as well as undesired behaviour (risk selection or no changes in behaviour) 
were included in the telephone poll. 
Findings delineated in the previous section revealed that employers’ behaviour 
may pre-eminently be explained on the basis of the intention to display these 
particular behavioural attitudes. Intention to behaviour is determined by em-
ployerial attitude and opinion, their weighing the pros and cons in terms of 
anticipated benefits and cost to be incurred; their belief or confidence at-
tached to their own effectiveness, the views of important other actors and 
their motivation to conform to these views. 
In the telephone poll conducted in the framework of the underlying study, 
these aspects were addressed in one way or the other. Questions were posed 
to employers as to their opinion in respect of the changes in social security leg-
islation. Besides, employers’ views were examined as to whether they expected 
to be able to influence employees’ disability for work. The questions examin-
ing the motives to reduce employees’ disability for work strived to gain an ini-
tial overview of the deliberations made by employers in this respect. Besides, 
questions were asked as to the motives for not intensifying the focus on reduc-
ing employees’ disability for work. Here, too, items were incorporated that 
might match weighing the pros and cons of anticipated yields and cost to be 
incurred. 
According to the behaviour model, social environment is of influential signifi-
cance when opting for specific behaviour. Contacts or agencies/actors 
that/who might exert potential influence, are insurance companies, Arbo-
services, enforcement agencies (Uvi’s), accountants, in-company staff, family, 
friends, acquaintances. Employers were asked whether they had approached 
these agencies/actors or had activated other contacts to gather information or 
to contract advice. Besides, questions were asked as to which agencies or ac-
tors had influenced the decision to opt or not to opt for intensifying the focus 
on reducing employees’ disability for work. 
Whether behavioural intention factually generates behavioural attitudes, 
mainly depends on possibilities or impossibilities of the employer (sensitivity, 
knowledge and skills), as well as on possibilities, preconditions or impossibili-
ties in the environment. These aspects were hardly examined in the telephone 
poll. However, the questions examining the motives for not intensifying the 
focus on reducing employee absenteeism/disability for work pertained to 
whether person-intrinsic impossibilities encountered had been of significance 
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4 Research  results 
4.1 Introduction 
The underlying chapter recapitulates the response by SME employers related 
to changes in social security legislation. The inventory was effected on the ba-
sis of data derived from the SME Policy Panel. Effective since 1998, a three-
times-a-year telephone poll examining an array of policy issues is being con-
ducted among approximately 2,500 SME employers (i.e. employers employing 
less than 100 staff) in this Panel. 
In the second poll (1999), the ‘prevention and reduction of employees’ disabil-
ity for work’ issue was one of the components. The poll examined a net sam-
ple of 2,119 participants of the SME Policy Panel. The questions related to so-
cial security were asked to 1,742 employers. The remaining 377 employers 
were excluded since they did not employ staff at that time. To serve aggrega-
tion to population level, use was made of the number of employers as pub-
lished in the ‘Bedrijven in Nederland’ of statistics Netherlands (CBS) publica-
tion. Table 15 in Annex I comprises data on the volume of the population and 
net sample survey, differentiated by sector and size class upon which the 
weights were calculated. 
The results presented relate to weighed numbers of employers. As regards the 
results, in nearly all cases, a differentiation by size class is made. Generally, the 
differences between sectors are not that large when considering the size class 
factor. Besides, in nearly all cases, an employee related distribution is pre-
sented. 
In the underlying chapter, we examine the question as to whether and how 
changes in legislation governing employees’ disability for work had effects on 
the behaviour of employers. Research by Besseling et al. (1999), based on data 
of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (SZW) Employers’ Panel, also 
examined whether government policy had spurred employers to further de-
velop their employees’ disability for work policy and Arbo-policy. Besides, in 
the afore-mentioned survey, an attempt was made to identify whether policy 
developments effected in employers generated reduced absenteeism rates and 
lower WAO influx. Where applicable and possible, the findings of both the 
survey and the underlying study will be compared, while considering that the 
survey of Besseling et al. relates to all employers while the underlying study 
covers the cluster of employers employing up to 100 staff. 
Section 4.2 discusses the response of employers to the changes in social secu-
rity legislation. Aspects examined include knowledge of the employer about 
changes in legislation, employers’ opinion in this respect, as well as the conse-
quences related to the focus put on reducing employees’ disability for work.  
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Section 4.3 focuses on employers that in recent years have intensified their fo-
cus on reducing employees’ disability for work. Inter alia, the section elabo-
rates on motives of the employer, activities unfolded and measures adopted, 
as well as on the impact of employers’ social environment. 
Section 4.4 outlines the findings related to employers that during recent years 
did not intensify their focus on reducing employees’ disability for work. 
Section 4.5 elaborates several explanatory analyses covering the issue whether 
or not employers have unfolded relevant activities. 
4.2  Employers’ response as regards the legal changes 
Knowledge in respect of Ziektewet changes 
More than 80 percent of the SME employers had knowledge about the Ziek-
tewet changes. More than half (56%) stated to be more or less informed 
about the changes (= average degree of knowledge); approximately one-
quarter stated to be informed in more detail (= high degree of knowledge); 17 
percent, however, had no or hardly any idea about the changes (= low degree 
of knowledge). Knowledge about Ziektewet changes was found to increase 
with size class.
1 
Table 1  Percent knowledge of Ziektewet changes 
  Degree of knowledge   
Size class  Low  Average  High  Don’t know  Total 
1-9 19  55  25  0  100 
10-49 7  58  35  .  100 
50-99 8  52  40  0  100 
Total employers  17  56  27  0  100 
Total employees  12  54  35  0  100 
Source: EIM, SME Panel 1999. 
Insurance cover 
More than three-quarters of all SME employers bought one or the other insur-
ance to cover (parts of) the financial risks of employees’ temporary incapacity 
to work. The share of policyholders appeared to be much higher among em-
ployers with less than 50 employees (i.e. 80% approximately) than among the 
50+ employers (56% policy holders). In addition, the data compiled by the SZW 
Employers’ Panel revealed that small(er) employers in particular had used the 
 
1   Differences (between sector, size class, …) that are mentioned in the text are significant at 
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possibility to reinsure themselves against the financial risks of continued wage 
payments to ill employees.
1 
Table 2  Insurance cover as regards risks of employees’ disability to work (percentages) 
 Insurance  cover?   
Size class  Yes  No  Don’t know  Total 
1-9 78  21  0  100 
10-49 83  16  1  100 
50-99 56  43  1  100 
Total employers  78  21  0  100 
Total employees  76  24  1  100 
Source: EIM, SME Panel 1999. 
Employers’ behaviour versus government measure 
The government bestowed more responsibility on employers as regards reduc-
ing employees’ disability for work. Nearly one-third of all SME employers had 
opposing views and adopted a negative stance in this respect. A slightly 
smaller employer cluster was found to hold neutral views about this govern-
ment policy. The largest cluster of SME employers, however, appeared to be 
content (i.e. positive) in this respect. Here, too, results were found to differ by 
size class, as 50+ employers adopted an averagely more positive attitude in re-
spect of the higher responsibility to be shouldered by employers. A large 
number of employers stated spontaneously to rate the higher responsibility as 
adequate, but not in the realm of the risque social (a/o sports-related acci-
dents). 
Table 3  Employers’ assessment of employers’ higher responsibility as regards employees’ dis-
ability for work (percentages) 
  Assessment by employers   
Size class  Positive  Neutral  Negative  Don’t know  Total 
1-9 37  29  33  1  100 
10-49 39  28  32  0  100 
50-99 58  27  14  1  100 
Total employers*  38  29  32  1  100 
Total employees  45  26  28  1  100 
* Excluding the risque social (a/o sports-related accidents). 
Source: EIM, SME Panel 1999. 
 
1   Besseling et al. (1999).  
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One of the changes in the Ziektewet entails that employers themselves are 
forced to effect continued wage payments to ill employees. A major share of 
the SME employers (i.e. 44%) rate this as inadequate, a slightly smaller em-
ployer cluster as fair, and merely 16 percent as adequate. The 50+ employers 
had an averagely more positive stance in this respect. Here, too, many (spon-
taneous) marginal comments were furnished in respect of cases where the 
causes of employees’ disability for work were rooted in the realm of the risque 
social (a/o sports-related accidents). 
Table 4  Employers’ assessment of continued wage payments in the event of illness (percent-
ages) 
  Assessment by employers   
Size class  Inadequate  Fair  Adequate  Don’t know  Total 
1-9 44  40  15  1  100 
10-49 41  42  17  0  100 
50-99 34  46  19  0  100 
Total employers  44  40  16  1  100 
Total employees  41  40  18  0  100 
Source: EIM, SME Panel 1999. 
Opinion as to whether or not absenteeism may be influenced 
Nearly two-thirds (65%) of the employers reckoned that employees’ disability 
for work can hardly or not at all be influenced. Approximately 22 percent  
were of the opinion that influence can be exerted to a certain extent, while 11 
percent thought that a high degree of influence can be exerted in this respect. 
Here, huge differences per size class were found. In 50+ employers, 64 percent 
reckoned that employee absenteeism/disability for work might be influenced 
(to a certain extent). As for smaller employers, this holds for approximately 35 
percent only. 
Table 5  Assessment of employers’ influence as to the volume of employees’ disability for 
work (percentages) 
  Influence possible on employees’ disability for work?   
Size class  To a high degree  To a certain extent  Hardly  Not at all  Don’t know  Total 
1-9  11 21 35  32  2  100 
10-49 11 28 32  28  1  100 
50-99 18 46 28  8  .  100 
Total employers  11  22  34  31  2  100 
Total employees  12  31  32  25  1  100 
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Identifiable impact on focus on employees’ disability for work? 
Only more than one-third (35%) of all employers employing half of all staff in 
SME stated to have intensified their focus on reducing employees’ disability 
for work during recent years. Particularly, this holds for employers that reck-
oned to be able to exert influence (to a certain extent) on the volume of em-
ployees’ disability for work, such as the slightly larger employers. In 50+ em-
ployers, nearly 80 percent had intensified their focus on reducing employees’ 
disability for work over the past years. Approximately 21 percent of the em-
ployers employing one-third of all staff in SME stated to have intensified their 
focus on reducing employees’ disability for work due to the changes in legisla-
tion. 
Table 6  Focus on employees’ disability for work (percentages) 
 Employers         
 Size  class        Employees 
 1-9  10-49  50-99  Total  Total 
More  focus  32 47 79 35 50 
•  Spurred by changes in legislation  19  31  46  21  33 
•  Irrespective of legis. changes  13  17  33  14  17 
Equal (i.e. unchanged) focus  68  53  21  65  50 
•  Subject already high on agenda  11  17  8  12  13 
•  Other  rationale  57 36 13 53 37 
Source: EIM, SME Panel 1999. 
During recent years, 12 percent of the SME employers did not intensify their 
focus on employees’ disability for work since the subject had already been 
high on the agenda. If this cluster were to be included, it would entail that 47 
percent of the employers employing 63 percent of staff in SME did reduce 
their employees’ disability for work rates. As yet, merely the smallest employ-
ers (employing less than 10 staff) did so to a limited degree. A large fraction, 
68 percent, did not change their focus, only 11 percent because the subject 
was already high on the agenda. 
The legal changes that were most effective in changing the focus of the em-
ployers were the abolition of the Ziektewet, and the introduction of Wulbz. 
To a lower extent, also the Arbowet
1 has been of significance here, albeit 
comparatively more in the smallest-employers cluster. 
 
1   Arbowet: Labour Conditions Act.  
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Table 7  Legislation spurring intensified focus on reducing employees’ disability for work (per-
cent of relevant employers/number of employees)* 
 Employers       
 Size  class      Employees 
Legislation  0-9  10-49 50-99 Total Total 
Changes in ZW, Wulbz  implementation  62 72 82 65 72 
Labour  Conditions  Act  35 31 22 34 30 
Changes in WAO, Pemba  implementation  7 17 10  9 13 
Disabled Reintegration Act (REA)**  3 0 2 2 1 
Combined  legislation  11 7 6  10 7 
Other  legislation  2 8 2 3 5 
Don't  know  3 2 2 3 3 
*  Figures do not add up to 100% per size class, as more answers were possible. 
**  REA: Wet op de (Re)ïntegratie Arbeidsgehandicapten. 
Source: EIM, SME Panel 1999. 
Remarkably, to a limited degree only, changes in WAO, as well as Pemba and 
REA
1 spurred employers to intensify their focus on reducing employees’ disabil-
ity for work rates. The findings of another survey among employers of the 
SZW Employers’ Panel, however, reveal that a majority of the employers (50 to 
60%) had stated that Pemba had spurred them to either expand their activi-
ties in the realm of preventing employees’ disability for work, and/or to scruti-
nise health-related risks more closely upon recruiting staff in the future.
2 
Gathering information and contracting advice 
More than two-thirds of all employers employing approximately 80 percent of 
all staff in SME had gathered information or contracted advice due to the 
Ziektewet privatisation. This percentage was found to be considerably higher 
among employers that had reinsured themselves than among those that had 
not reinsured themselves (75 and 50 percent of all employers, respectively). 
Insurance companies were found to be the source of information primarily 
approached by employers (53% of all employers that had contracted advice).
3 
Other often stated sources of information were accountants, Arbo-services and 
enforcement agencies (Uvi’s). Merely a limited part of the employers had been 
advised by in-company staff or family, friends and acquaintances. As for small-
scale employers, mainly insurance companies and accountants were of signifi-
 
1   REA: Effective January 1998. Law includes all kinds of measures for the (re)integration of the 
disabled. Employers as well as the non-working disabled can ask for provisions financed by the 
REA budget. 
2   Besseling et al. (1999). 
3   As explicitly stated in the telephone poll (Question SZ09A1): Excluding invitation for insurance 
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cance in this respect, whereas Arbo-services were important for large-scale 
employers. 
Table  8  Information gathered or advice contracted in the framework of ZW  privatisation 
(percentages)* 
  Employers       
  Size  class      Employees 
Info gathered/advice contracted  0-9  10-49  50-99  Total  Total 
Yes  71  80 83 69  80 
No  29  20 16 30  20 
Don't  know  0  0 1 0  1 
Total 100  100  100  100  100 
If yes: Agencies/actors furnishing info/advice (percent of all relevant employers/employees;  
total= 100) 
Insurance  company  53  55 33 53  51 
Accountant  47  42 21 46  39 
Arbo-services  42  57 74 45  57 
Enforcement agency (Uvi)  











Family, friends, acquaintances  5  5  9  5  5 
In-company  staff  4  8 8 5  8 
Other  actor(s)  19  19 22 19  19 
Don't  know  0  1 2 1  1 
* Figures do not add up to 100% per size class, as more agencies/actors could be approached. 
Source: EIM, SME Panel 1999. 
4.3  Employers who intensified their focus on reducing employees’ 
disability for work 
As stated before, more than one-third of the employers unfolded more activi-
ties to reduce the volume of employees’ disability for work in recent years (see 
table 6). The major grounds for SME employers to do so entailed financial rea-
sons (64%; see table 9). Another major reason stated by employers was that 
they attached more importance to staff health (55%), or had gained increas-
ing knowledge of in-company health hazards (47%). These findings corre-
spond with the findings of the SZW Employers’ Panel
1, whose employers stated 
to have intensified their focus on employees’ disability for work policy. Finan-
cial incentives aside, this might be explained by the fact that a cultural change 
 
1   Besseling et al. (1999).  
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transpired causing employers as well as employees to increase their focus on 
the consequences of employees’ disability for work. 
Comparatively many of the employers among the 39 percent employers who 
had intensified their focus on reducing employees’ disability for work did so in 
order to enhance task attractiveness for staff; more than one-quarter of the 
employers did so because of problems encountered in respect of ill employees. 
Other, considerably less stated reasons included ‘following third-party advice', 
‘higher rate of employees’ disability for work’ or ‘due to staff request’. Occa-
sionally, reasons stated to justify the higher focus concerned employer conti-
nuity, the tight labour market and (ISO) certification. 
Table 9  Motives for intensifying focus on reducing employees’ disability for work (percent of 
relevant employers/employees)* 
  Employers       
  Size  class      Employees 
Motives  0-9  10-49 50-99 Total  Total 
Financial  motives  62  69 66 64  69 




























































Third-party  advice  11  19 25 13  17 
Staff  request  11  12 26 12  15 
Other  motives  20  19 30 20  20 
Don't  know  2  0 0 1  0 
* Figures do not add up to 100% per size class, as more answers were possible. 
Source: EIM, SME Panel 1999. 
Activities undertaken 
Increasing focus on reducing employees’ disability for work pertains to various 
activities undertaken. The majority of the employers stated adaptation of 
tasks or workplace as preventive measures. Yet also the other activities distin-
guished had been adopted by more than half of the relevant employers. EIM Business & Policy Research  37 
Table 10  Activities adopted to reduce or prevent employees’ disability for work (percent of 
relevant employers/employees) 
  Employers       
  Size  class      Employees 
Activities  unfolded  0-9  10-49 50-99 Total  Total 
Adaptation of tasks or workplace to 









































Improved coaching of ill employees  62  71  87  65  77 
Instruction of employees to improve 























Unsurprisingly, larger employers undertook much more activities, given the 
higher extent of strategic HRM policy enforced. Larger employers focused on 
improved coaching of ill employees and improved checks on absenteeism. Re-
markably, two out of three employers enforced health-related risk selection 
upon the recruitment of future staff. In this respect, larger employers were 
found to be considerably more reluctant than smaller companies.  
Reintegration measures 
More than half (52%) of the employers who intensified their focus on reduc-
ing employees’ disability for work had employed long-term ill or disabled staff 
during recent years. Unsurprisingly, this holds in particular for slightly larger 
employers, given their higher share of staff employed. Two-thirds of the em-
ployers that employed long-term ill or disabled employees had adopted spe-
cific measures on behalf of these employees to ensure their in-company rein-
tegration, i.e. by means of task adaptation or by granting another position. 
Again, this applies more to the larger employers.   
38  EIM Business & Policy Research 
Table  11  Experience gained in terms of long-term ill or (partially) disabled employees and 
measures adopted (percent of relevant employers/employees) 
  Employers       
  Size  class      Employees 
  0-9  10-49 50-99 Total  Total 
No experience gained  53  35  23  48  32 
Experience  gained  47  65 77 52  68 
























Total 100  100  100  100  100 
Source: EIM, SME Panel 1999. 
Influence exerted by agencies/actors 
Primarily Arbo-services were of substantial significance when opting for an in-
tensified focus on reducing employees’ disability for work. This holds for 47 
percent of the relevant employers. To a considerably lower extent (i.e. 12 and 
11 percent of the relevant employers, respectively), enforcement agencies 
(Uvi’s) and insurance companies were of significance. Accountants (5 percent) 
and in-company staff (5 percent) were stated to a low degree only. Nearly 30 
percent of the employers who had intensified their focus on reducing em-
ployee absenteeism/disability for work stated that other parties/actors had not 
been of major significance. Unsurprisingly - since they had gathered more in-
formation from that source -, it was found that large-scale employers had 
been more often influenced by Arbo-services. 
4.4  Employers who did not intensify their focus on reducing em-
ployees’ disability for work 
Nearly two out of three employers (65%) did not change their behavioural 
pattern over the past years (see table 12). The majority of these employers did 
not see any necessity to change, as they had not encountered problems as re-
gards employees’ disability for work (70%). Approximately 18 percent stated 
that reducing employee absenteeism/disability for work had already been high 
on their agenda. EIM Business & Policy Research  39 
Table 12  Motives underpinning equal (i.e. unchanged) focus on reducing employees’ disability 
for work (percent of relevant employers/number of employees)* 
  Employers       
  Size  class      Employees 
Motives  0-9  10-49 50-99 Total  Total 
No problems encountered as regards 











Subject already high on the agenda  16  33  40  18  27 
Employees’ disability for work  











Insufficient  benefits  2  1 2 2  2 












Lack of time/lack of opportunity  0  1  1  0  0 
Too high cost involved  0  0  1  0  0 
Covered by insurance  0  0  0  0  0 
Other  motives  16  14 10 16  14 
Don't  know  0  0 0 0  0 
* Figures do not add up to 100% per size class, as more answers were possible. 
Source: EIM, SME Panel 1999. 
Employers hardly or not at all, stated lack of time/lack of opportunity, cost (to 
be) incurred, insufficient benefits or covered by insurance as reasons. A small 
share had not intensified their focus on reducing employees’ disability for 
work since the latter were unrelated to the work/workplace. A very small  
share of employers were inclined to, yet had no idea how to tackle this issue.  
Primarily small-scale employers had not encountered problems as regards em-
ployees’ disability for work. The reasoning that the subject was already high 
on the agenda was comparatively more often stated by medium-scale and  
large-scale employers.  
Upon the question which agencies/actors had been of significance as regards 
decision-making in this respect, the majority (75%) of the employers who had 
not intensified their focus on reducing employees’ disability for work in recent 
years stated that they made this choice on their own - unsurprisingly, consider-
ing that the majority of these companies stated not to have encountered any 
problems in this respect. 
4.5 Explanatory  analyses 
Following the recapitulation of single relationships in previous sections of this 
chapter, the underlying section elaborates more in-depth employers’ behav-
iour, and the factors affecting that behaviour, while utilising multivariate 
analysis techniques.  
40  EIM Business & Policy Research 
So as to identify factors affecting changes in the focus on reducing employees’ 
disability for work in recent years, a logit model was estimated. In this analysis, 
no differentiation was made as yet as to the reasons to intensify/not intensify 
the focus due to changes in legislation. Table 13 recapitulates the correspond-
ing results. Owing to the high number of observations, only parameters at 5%- 
and 1%-level were marked as significant. 
The results confirm the image presented in table 6, i.e. that large employers 
have intensified the focus on reducing employees’ disability for work. Several 
sectoral differences were found that, however, can not be explained easily. 
Employers commanding more knowledge about Wulbz have intensified their 
focus. Remarkably, employers that reinsured themselves have not significantly 
intensified or decreased their focus on employees’ disability for work. Lastly, 
the assessment as to whether any influence may be exerted on employees’ dis-
ability for work is of significance, as employers who reckoned that influence 
may be exerted here were found to have intensified their focus. 
Table 13  Logit model: Higher focus on reducing employees’ disability for work in recent years 
Variable Coefficient    Standard  error 
Volume (ref. 50-100)       
•  1-9 employees  -1.47  *  0.16 
•  10-49 employees  -0.96  *  0.14 
Sector (ref. manufacturing industry)       
•  Construction 0.02    0.20 
•  Trades -0.36    0.20 
•  Hotel & catering  -0.60  *  0.23 
•  Transport/haulage 0.02    0.23 
•  Rental agencies  -0.64  *  0.22 
•  Financial services  -0.21    0.22 
•  Other services  -0.12    0.25 
•  Non-private sector  0.05    0.22 
Knowledge of Wulbz 0.19  **  0.09 
Reinsured 0.10    0.13 
Positive attitude versus more responsibility  







Positive attitude as regards financial incentives  0.08    0.09 
Assessment degree of employers’ influence on 







Constant -0.74  *  0.35 
*  Significant at 1% level; N = 1,696. 
**  Significant at 5% level; N = 1,696. 
Source: EIM, SME Panel 1999. 
Table 14 comprises an identical analysis while incorporating the focus due to 
changes in legislation as an independent variable. Here, too, knowledge and EIM Business & Policy Research  41 
assessment of yes-or-no-potential-influence were found to be of significance. 
Besides, whether or not employers had reinsured themselves was of no signifi-
cance. This allows for the conclusion that there is no large cluster of employers 
that reinsured themselves due to the launching of financial incentives in social 
security legislation, and henceforth ceased to effect active policy to reduce 
employees’ disability for work. This conclusion corresponds with the findings 
of Besseling et al. (1999, p. 37). Remarkably, it was found that employers 
adopting a positive attitude versus the financial incentives imbedded in Wulbz 
did intensify their focus due to changes in legislation. This indicates the signifi-
cance of a positive attitude of employers as regards materialisation of behav-
ioural changes as desired by the government. 
Table 14  Logit model: Higher focus on reducing employees’ disability for work in recent years 
due to changes in legislation 
Variable Coefficient    Standard  error 
Volume (ref. 50-100)       
•  1-9 employees  -1.04  *  0.16 
•  10-49 employees  -0.63  *  0.14 
Sector (ref. manufacturing industry)       
•  Construction 0.45  **  0.20 
•  Trades 0.21    0.20 
•  Hotel & catering  -0.35    0.26 
•  Transport/haulage 0.44    0.24 
•  Rental agencies  -0.26    0.23 
•  Financial services  -0.32    0.23 
•  Other services  0.08    0.27 
•  Non-private sector  0.28    0.21 
Knowledge of Wulbz 0.20  **  0.09 
Reinsured -0.06    0.13 
Positive attitude versus more responsibility  







Positive attitude as regards financial incentives  0.20  *  0.09 
Assessment degree of employers’ influence on 







Constant -2.13  *  0.37 
*  1% significance level; N = 1,696. 
**  5% significance level; N = 1,696. 
Source: EIM, SME Panel 1999. 
Conceivably, owing to the integration of the whether-an-employer-is-
reinsured-or-not variable, the afore-stated analysis might be affected by a 
methodological dilemma - as, in all probability, employers’ opting for reinsur-
ance might be determined by factors identical to those integrated in the logit 
model. Therefore, a logit model was calculated while integrating reinsurance 
as the explanatory variable versus all other explanatory variables. The analysis  
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revealed the substantial significance of size class; i.e. the share of reinsured 
employers rose with decreasing employer size. Although average employees’ 
disability for work figures were found to be lower in the smallest employers, 
the probability of an excess risk is larger. The smallest employers thus had less 
demand for higher responsibilities in this respect. Besides, smaller-scale em-
ployers often stated not to be able to exert any influence whatsoever on the 
volume of employees’ disability for work. Besides size class, merely one other 
difference between employers that did and those that did not reinsure them-
selves was found; i.e. employers reckoning that employees’ disability for work 
may not be influenced, had reinsured themselves more often - another unsur-
prising, size class-related result. 
Next, a logit analysis was effected analogous to that in table 14, while omit-
ting the more or less endogenous reinsured-or-not variable. This exercise did 
not produce different parameter estimations. Identical variables are signifi-
cant. 
In order to determine whether the behavioural aspects correlate a factor ana-
lysis has been carried out on the aspects of the behaviour employers that have 
intensified their focus on reducing employee absenteeism/disability to work. 
The six aspects are: 
•  checking in the event of employee absenteeism/disability for work 
•  improved coaching of ill employees 
•  adaptation of tasks or workplace to prevent work-related illness 
•  promotion of personal protective-gear use 
•  instruction of employees to improve tackling in-company health hazards 
•  improved focus on health upon staff recruitment. 
The analysis shows three significant factors (with eigenvalue > 1): 
1. The  preventive employers, who have improved coaching, adapted tasks or 
workplace to prevent, promoted the use of protective-gear use and in-
structed employees to improve tackling health hazards. 
2. The  curative employers, who have checked more in the event of employee 
absenteeism/disability for work and who have improved coaching of ill em-
ployees. 
3. The  defensive employers, who have checked more in the event of employee 
absenteeism/disability for work and who have improved their focus on 
health upon staff recruitment.  
There is no clear relationship between these typologies and size class. This can 
be explained by the small differences in size class from the activities (see table 
10). Also some variables within a factor show different relationships with size 
class. For example in the third factor, bigger firms have adopted more checks 
but smaller firms have enforced health-related risk selection. 
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5  Summary and conclusions 
5.1 Background 
In recent years, many changes were implemented in legislation governing em-
ployees’ disability for work. With the objective to reduce numbers of ill and 
disabled persons, the implementation of Wulbz and Pemba shifted a great 
deal of responsibility for ill employees to employers. This was effected by 
launching financial incentives. As for Wulbz, this is realised by compelling em-
ployers to continue wage payments to ill employees during the first year of 
disability. Wulbz thus makes up for the fact that the sickness benefit act (Ziek-
tewet) for employees was abolished. Pemba, amongst others, caters for vari-
able contribution rates depending on influx of the number of disabled from a 
given employer into the disability scheme. The rationale underpinning these 
laws entails that financial incentives launched should stimulate employers to 
ensure that employees’ disability for work rates are kept as low as possible. 
Employers’ response to the changes in legislation may differ, and their behav-
ioural response may not necessarily correspond with the behaviour aspired to 
by legislators when implementing that legislation. Moreover, the question 
remains whether employers’ behaviour factually contributes to reducing the 
volume of employees’ disability for work. The relationship between govern-
ment policy, business policy and effect is of a rather complex nature. The un-
derlying study mainly focuses on the relationship between changes in legisla-
tion and reactive changes in employers’ behaviour. 
5.2  Problem definition and research questions 
The general problem definition of the underlying study reads as follows: 
 
What are the effects of financial (dis)incentives in government legislation 
on the behaviour of employers in small and medium-sized firms (SMEs)? 
With respect to this case study of social security, this problem definition leads 
to the following research questions: 
1.  What changes in employers’ behaviour have occurred due to the recent 
changes in social security legislation? In particular, which changes have oc-
curred in the field of reintegration, selection of staff and labour condi-
tions? 
2.  What is the relationship between characteristics of the employer, the em-
ployer and the above-mentioned behaviour? Is there a difference depend-
ing on the size of firms? Can typologies in the behaviour of employers be 
found?  
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3.  What have been the effects of the behaviour of employers on short-term 
and long-term incapacity to work? 
4.  Are there undesired influences or side effects of the changes in legislation, 
due to employers’ behaviour? 
5.3 Methodology 
In the framework of the underlying study, a telephone poll was conducted 
among a Panel of SME employers.
1 This Panel comprises more than 2,000 SME 
employers (employing up to 100 staff) that will be polled several times a year 
on various topics. During this telephone poll, employers were requested to in-
dicate whether they displayed specific attitudes and behaviour that are char-
acteristic as regards reducing disability for work. Besides, questions were 
posed as to the correlation with relevant legislation. Moreover, in this tele-
phone poll, an attempt was made to gain an initial overview as to employers’ 
motives to effectuate/not to effectuate measures in the framework of reduc-
ing disability for work. Besides, a literature survey was conducted, examining 
the social security regime in the Netherlands, as well as models explaining the 
influence exerted on behaviour.  
5.4 Results 
Knowledge as regards changes, and assessment of changes 
The research findings reveal that the majority of the employers commanded 
knowledge of the Ziektewet changes. This holds in particular for employers 
employing 10+ staff. Opinions on these changes strongly vary. On average, 
larger employers (employing 50+ staff) rated the changes as more positive 
than smaller employers did, partly owing to the fact that larger employers  
were more often of the opinion that influence may be exerted as regards the 
volume of employees’ disability for work. 
Additional focus on reducing employees’ disability for work and on Arbo-
policy 
One major conclusion of this research is that the changes in legislation govern-
ing disability for work only had a limited impact on the behaviour of employ-
ers. Only 35 percent of the SME employers had factually intensified their focus 
on reducing employees’ disability for work over the past years. A significant 
difference by size class was, however, found. Hardly one-third of the employ-
ers with less than 10 employees had become more active in this field in recent 
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years, versus nearly 80 percent of the employers employing 50 to 100 staff. 
These 35 percent may be further divided into 21 percent of employers who say 
they had become more active due to changes in social security legislation, and 
14 percent in respect of whom the above does not hold. In addition, 12 per-
cent of the companies stated not to have intensified their focus since the sub-
ject had already been high on the agenda. 
Size class-attributable differences aside, it was found that commanding know-
ledge about legislation was much more likely to spur employers to intensify 
the focus on employees’ disability for work. Besides, a significant correlation 
was found between opinions as to whether or not influence may be exerted 
on disability for work. Employers who reckoned that influence may be exerted 
in this respect, were found to have intensified their focus on employees’ dis-
ability for work. Also, one may conclude that more positive attitudes versus 
changes in legislation had also contributed to a higher focus by employers on 
reducing disability for work due to those changes. 
Remarkably, whether or not employers had reinsured risks, appeared to be of 
no significance as regards intensifying the focus on reducing employees’ dis-
ability for work. Apparently, other factors had been of relevance in this re-
spect. From previous research it could already be concluded that there were no 
differences between employers reinsured and those who were bearing their 
own risks as regards revising their employees’ disability for work and Arbo-
policy.
1 Besseling et al. did, however, identify differences in disability for work 
rates: When considering several employer characteristics, such as size, employ-
ees’ disability for work rates appeared to be significantly higher in employers 
that had reinsured themselves than among employers that were bearing their 
own risks. Apparently, employers that had reinsured themselves had perceived 
less direct financial incentives to reduce employees disability for work rates. 
Changes in behaviour mainly attributable to Wulbz and Arbowet 
Policies adopted by SME employers were mainly affected by Ziektewet chan-
ges, the Wulbz implementation and the Arbowet. Changes in the WAO, and 
implementation of the Pemba and REA Acts, had less impact on SME as 
regards intensifying the focus on reducing employee absenteeism/disability for 
work. This might be caused by the recent introduction of the latter. 
Reasons for additional focus on reducing employees’ disability for work and 
on Arbo-policy 
Reasons to intensify the focus on reducing the volume of employees’ disability 
for work primarily entailed finance-related motives (64%). Besides, the 
changes in legislation also appeared to have spurred a change in culture: Ap-
 
1   Besseling et al. (1999).  
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proximately half of the employers stated that they had attached more impor-
tance to staff health, and an improved knowledge as regards in-company 
health hazards. Moreover, nearly 40 percent of the employers stated to com-
bat employees’ disability for work by enhancing task attractiveness for staff. In 
more than one-quarter of the employers, the reasons were attributable to 
problems encountered in respect of ill employees. 
Employers’ behaviour 
Behavioural attitudes of employers who intensified their focus on employees 
disability for work and reintegration mainly manifested themselves in the 
adoption of preventive measures, such as adaptation of tasks or workplace, 
promotion of personal protective-gear use and instruction of employees to 
improve tackling in-company health hazards. Remarkably, despite of being 
prohibited by law, employers also adopted an improved focus on health upon 
staff recruitment. The latter entails an undesired effect of the implementation 
of modified legislation. Activities more often unfolded in the event of em-
ployees’ disability for work entailed improved coaching of ill employees and 
more checks on employees’ disability for work. The latter activities were pri-
marily found in larger employers. Besides, two out of three employers were 
found to enforce health-related risk selection upon staff recruitment; this 
holds for smaller employers in particular. Considering reintegration activities 
unfolded by employers who intensified their focus on employees disability for 
work, it was found that more than half of these employers had had long-term 
ill or disabled employees on their payrolls over the past years. Two out of 
three of these employers had adopted specific measures to enable in-company 
reintegration of these employees, by means of either adaptation of tasks or by 
granting another position. This holds for larger employers in particular. 
The following typologies in the behaviour of employers were distinguished: 
1. The  preventive employers, who have improved coaching, adapted tasks or 
workplace to prevent, promoted the use of protective-gear use and in-
structed employees to improve tackling health hazards. 
2. The  curative employers, who have checked more in the event of employee 
absenteeism/disability for work and who have improved coaching of ill em-
ployees. 
3. The  defensive employers, who have checked more in the event of employee 
absenteeism/disability for work and who have improved their focus on 
health upon staff recruitment.  
Reasons for equal (i.e. unchanged) focus on reducing employees’ disability for 
work and on Arbo-policy 
Employers who during recent years did not change their focus on employees’ 
disability for work, generally failed to see the necessity thereof as they stated 
not to have encountered problems as regards disability for work, and/or be-
cause they reckoned that no influence could be exerted in this respect. On av-EIM Business & Policy Research  47 
erage, passive employers operated more small-scale businesses; besides, em-
ployees’ disability for work rates often lingered around much lower levels in 
smaller employers. A small share of those employers who had not intensified 
their focus on reducing employees’ disability for work rates did not do so be-
cause that subject had already been high on their agenda. The highest re-
sponse rate in terms of subject-already-high-on-the-agenda was found among 
larger employers. 
Impact of social environment on employers’ behaviour 
The underlying study also elaborates on the impact of the social environment 
on employers’ behaviour. The findings reveal that - spurred by the Ziektewet 
privatisation - a considerable majority of the employers had gathered informa-
tion or contracted advice. This holds in particular for employers that drew in-
surance to cover the financial risks of employees’ disability for work. Insurance 
companies were stated as the most prominent source of information, followed 
by accountants, Arbo-services and enforcement agencies (Uvi’s). Furthermore, 
nearly half of the employers who had intensified their focus on reducing em-
ployees’ disability for work had gathered subject-related information at Arbo-
services. Here too, this holds for larger-scale employers in particular. Other 
agencies/actors, such as enforcement agencies (Uvi’s) and insurance companies, 
were of much less significance in this respect. The majority of the employers 
who deliberately had not intensified their focus on reducing the volume of 
employees’ disability for work had not been influenced by any other agen-
cies/actors. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Relationship between government policy and employers’ behaviour 
The research findings reveal a limited impact of legislation governing the do-
main of employees’ disability for work on employers’ behaviour, as well as on 
business policies in SME, as illustrated by the fact that - due to changes in 
legislation - 35% of the employers had intensified their focus on reducing em-
ployees’ disability for work rates. It should be considered, however, that a 
higher focus was primarily found in larger employers. Particularly, smaller em-
ployers with less than 10 employees as yet hardly focus on reducing employ-
ees’ disability for work. Government policy spurred employers to take much 
more account of the financial consequences of employees’ disability for work 
as regards their business operations. This is illustrated by the fact that the 
most prominent reason stated for an intensified focus on reducing employees’ 
disability for work and on Arbo-policy are finance-related motives. Besides, 
government policy was also accountable for the substantially enhanced 
knowledge among employers as regards the significance of healthy and moti- 
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vated staff, as well as for the improved knowledge as regards in-company 
health hazards. 
Relationship between the complex of government policy, business policy and 
impact on employees’ disability for work 
The afore-stated conclusions mainly pertain to the relationship between gov-
ernment policy and business policy. The underlying study does not (or hardly) 
elaborate(s) on the relationship between government policy, business policy 
and the impact thereof on the volume of employees’ disability for work. This 
relationship is of a rather complex nature; it is, therefore, not easy to identify 
whether employers’ response spurred by behaviour due to changes in legisla-
tion had genuine effect on the volume of employees’ disability for work. The 
major problem here entails that an array of exogenous factors may affect that 
impact. Partly, this is also attributable to the recent implementation of the 
legislation, as - therefore - the time span to identify any effect is short, 
particularly as regards Pemba. Besides, the underlying study covers a field still 
developing both at present and in the immediate future. 
Recommendations as regards follow-up studies 
By means of the underlying study, EIM furnished an initial onset to gain know-
ledge about the relationship between government policy, business policy and 
the effects thereof on the volume of employees’ disability for work. The 
relationship between behaviour and effects, and - thus - indirectly the rela-
tionship between government policy and effects, should be further examined. 
Ever since the social security regime’s modification of 1987, the government 
unfolded a multitude of measures to curb the volume of employees’ disability 
for work. In their majority, these measures aimed to influence the behaviour 
of one or more of the parties involved (employers, employees and social secu-
rity enforcement agencies (Uvi’s)). To serve additional policy formulation in 
this domain, it is essential to gain knowledge as to the factual effects of these 
measures. 
Another interesting aspect for follow-up studies is the introduction of finan-
cial incentives in legislation. Full wage payments throughout the first year of 
illness (Ziektewet-year) and financial incentives in the WAO contribution sys-
tem meant a new development in the social security regime. Following the 
identification of employers’ behaviour in response, and the impact thereof on 
employees’ disability for work rates, follow-up studies could examine the fea-
sibility of launching additional incentives. 
Furthermore, follow-up studies might serve as models for incentives (to be 
launched) in other legislation domains. Finally, further research may also in-
clude an international comparative survey in the field of employees’ disability 
for work, examining the question how legislation is enforced in other coun-
tries, as well as the role of the government and public/private parties. Meas-
ures adopted in other countries to reduce the volume of employees’ disability EIM Business & Policy Research  49 
for work may also be examined, as favourable and unfavourable experience 
gained abroad may serve the future development of the social security regime 
in the Netherlands. 
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Annex I:  The SME Policy Panel 
Table 15 recapitulates the net sample survey figures. To serve aggregation to 
population level, use was made of the number of employers as mentioned in 
the ‘Bedrijven in Nederland’ CBS publication, whose data are also included in 
the table. Based on this information, weights were attributed to employers 
while differentiating by sector and size class. 
Table 15  Number of SME employers in the SME Policy Panel and at population level, differen-
tiated by sector and size class 
  Population (x 1,000)   
  Size class (# of employees)    Size class (# of employees)   
Sector  1-9 10-49  50-99 Total  1-9  10-49  50-99 Total 
Manufacturing  20 8  1  30 56  103 83  242 
Construction  22 7  1  29 62 83 94  239 
Trades  87  13  1  101 87 95 82  264 
Hotel  &  catering  27 2  0  29 78 70 14  162 
Transport/haulage  11 3  0  15 45 65 29  139 
Rental  agencies 40 6  1  48 42 86 52  180 
Financial  services 8 1  0  9 91 78 25  194 
Other  services  25 5  2  32 35 76  6  117 
Non-private  sector  25 2  0  28 43 73 89  205 
Total  266 47  7  321 539 729 474  1,742 
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Annex II:  Questionnaire for telephone survey 
Question SZPERS 
Do you employ staff? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3.  Don't know/no answer 
If Question SZPERS = larger than 1, THEN proceed to Question SZAFSL 
Question SZ01INT 
Effective March 1996, the Wulbz (Wet Uitbreiding Loondoorbetalingsplicht Bij Ziekte) 
was enforced. This new Act is also referred to as the Ziektewet privatisation. From that 
date onward, it is mandatory for employers themselves to remunerate ill employees. 
Question SZ01 




4.  Don't know/no answer 
Question SZ02 




3.  Don't know/no answer 
Question SZ03INT 
By means of financial incentives, the government attempts to motivate employers to 
adopt an improved approach in reducing employee absenteeism/disability for work.  
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Question SZ03A 
Do you adopt a positive, neutral or negative attitude as regards the fact that employers 
themselves have to assume more responsibility in this respect? 




5. Very  negative 
6.  Don't know/no answer 
Question SZ03B 
As regards the measure adopted for this purpose, entailing that it is mandatory for 
employers themselves to remunerate ill employees: Do you rate this measure as inade-




4.  Don't know/no answer 
Question SZ04 
May employee absenteeism/disability for work in your employer to a high degree, to a 
certain extent, hardly or not at all be influenced? 
1.  To a high degree 
2.  To a certain extent 
3. Hardly 
4. Not  at  all 
5.  Don't know/no answer 
Question SZ05A 
Did you intensify your focus on reducing employee absenteeism/disability for work dur-
ing recent years? 
1. Yes  2.  No 
If Question SZ05A = answer 1, THEN proceed to Question SZ05B, ELSE proceed to 
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Question SZ05B 
Was that also due to changes in legislation? 
1. Yes  2.  No 
IF question SZ05B = answer 1, THEN proceed to Question SZ05C, ELSE proceed to Ques-
tion SZ06 
Question SZ05C 
What type of legislation? 
[POLLSTER:   Spontaneous answers required] 
1. Changes  in  Ziektewet, Wulbz implementation 
2. Changes  in  WAO, Pemba implementation 
3. Labour  Conditions  Act  (Arbowet) 
4.  Disabled Reintegration Act (REA) 
5. Combined  legislation 
6. Other  legislation;  viz.: ... 
7. Don't  know/no  answer 
Question SZ06 
Why did you intensify your focus on reducing employee absenteeism/disability for 
work? 
[POLLSTER:   READ ALOUD:] 
[POLLSTER:  Only record ‘Other reason(s)’ if answer is definitely not attributable to 
any other item] 
1. Financial  reasons 
2.  Higher rate of employee absenteeism/disability for work 
3.  More importance attached to staff health 
4.  Problems encountered in respect of ill employees 
5.  So as to enhance task attractiveness for staff 
6.  Improved knowledge as regards in-company health hazards 
7. Staff  request 
8. Third-party  advice 
9. Other  reason(s);  viz.: ... 
10. Don't  know/no  answer  
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If Question SZ05A = answer 1, THEN proceed to Question SZ08INT 
Question SZ07 
Why did you not intensify your focus on reducing employee absenteeism/disability for 
work? 
[POLLSTER:  Spontaneous answers required] 
[POLLSTER:  Only record ‘Other reason(s)’ if answer is definitely not attributable to 
any other item] 
1.  No problems encountered as regards employee absenteeism/disability for work 
2.  Inclined to - yet no idea how to tackle this issue 
3.  Lack of time/lack of opportunity 
4.  Too high cost involved 
5. Insufficient  benefits 
6.  Subject already high on the agenda 
7.  Employee absenteeism/disability for work unrelated to work/workplace 
8. Covered  by  insurance 
9. Other  motives;  viz.: ... 
10. Don't  know/no  answer 
If Question SZ05A = answer 2, THEN proceed to Question SZ09A1 
Question SZ08INT 
I shall state several activities that employers may adopt to reduce or prevent employee 
absenteeism/disability for work. Employers may seek the support of, for instance, Arbo-
services in this respect. Please state in respect of every activity whether it was applica-
ble to an increasing degree over the past years. 
Question SZ08A 
Activity 1:   [POLLSTER: READ ALOUD: ‘More checks in the event of employee absentee-
ism/disability for work?’] 
1. Yes  2. No 
Question SZ08B 
Activity 2:  [POLLSTER: READ ALOUD: ‘Improved coaching of ill employees?’] 
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Question SZ08C 
Activity 3:  [POLLSTER: READ ALOUD: ‘Adaptation of tasks or workplace to prevent 
work-related illness of employees?’] 
1. Yes  2. No 
Question SZ08D 
Activity 4:  [POLLSTER: READ ALOUD: ‘Promotion of personal protective-gear use?’] 
1. Yes  2. No 
Question SZ08E 
Activity 5:  [POLLSTER: READ ALOUD: ‘Instruction of employees to improve tackling in-
company health hazards, for instance by means of facilitating 
training?’] 
1. Yes  2. No 
Question SZ08F 
Activity 6:  [POLLSTER: READ ALOUD: ‘Improved focus on health upon staff recruit-
ment?’] 
1. Yes  2. No 
Question SZ08G1 




3. Don't  know/no  answer 
IF Question SZ08G1 = larger than 1, THEN proceed to Question SZ09A1 
Question SZ08G2 
Activity 7:  [POLLSTER: READ ALOUD: ‘Did you adopt specific measures as regards these 
long-term ill or disabled employees, so as to facilitate their in-
company reintegration, for instance by means of task adapta-
tion or by granting another position?’] 
1. Yes  2. No  
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Question SZ09A1 
Did you gather information or contract advice upon Ziektewet privatisation? 
[POLLSTER:  Excluding invitation for insurance quotations] 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don't  know/no  answer 
IF Question SZ09A1 = larger than 1, and Question SZ05A = answer 1, THEN proceed to 
Question SZ09C1 
If Question SZ05A = answer 2, THEN proceed to Question SZ09C2 
Question SZ09A2 
Where did you gather information or contract advice? 
[POLLSTER: READ  ALOUD] 
1. Insurance  company 
2. Arbo-services 
3.  Enforcement agency (Uvi) or industrial insurance board 
4. Accountant 
5. In-company  staff 
6. Family,  friends,  acquaintances 
7.  Other actors; viz.:  ... 
8. Don't  know/no  answer 
[POLLSTER:  Record answers ‘GAK’, ‘CADANS’, ‘DETAM’, ‘GUO’, ‘SFB’ and ‘BVG’ sub 3] 
IF Question SZ05A = answer 1, THEN proceed to Question SZ09C1 
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Question SZ09C1 
Which agencies/actors were of significance when you opted for intensified reducing of 
employee absenteeism/disability for work? 
1. No  agency/actor 
2. Insurance  company 
3.  Arbo-services 
4. Enforcement  agency  (Uvi) or industrial insurance board 
5. Accountant 
6. In-company  staff 
7. Family,  friends,  acquaintances 
8. Other  actors;  viz.: ... 
9. Don't  know/no  answer 
[POLLSTER:  Record answers ‘GAK’, ‘CADANS’, ‘DETAM’, ‘GUO’, ‘SFB’ and ‘BVG’ sub 4] 
Question SZ09C2 
Which agencies/actors were of significance when you opted for not reducing employee 
absenteeism/disability for work to a higher extent? 
1. No  agency/actor 
2. Insurance  company 
3. Arbo-services 
4.  Enforcement agency (Uvi) or industrial insurance board 
5. Accountant 
6. In-company  staff 
7. Family,  friends,  acquaintances 
8.  Other actors; viz.:  ... 
9. Don't  know/no  answer 
 